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Surviving the Committee of
Enquiry: A Thriving BBC (1922–
1995)




1 Wireless telephony was seen first, by UK authorities, as a means of communication for
the armed forces. The Postmaster-General (PMG, the minister with responsibility for
the  technology)  at  the  end  of  the  First  World  War,  Albert  Illingworth,  resisted  all
requests from amateurs and from the manufacturers of wireless receiving equipment
to grant them licences to broadcast, fearing that commercial uses and interests would
interfere  with  what  needed  to  remain  a  serious  and  tightly-controlled  tool.  The
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, which held many of the patents for radio, was
particularly insistent in its repeated applications, in the hope that its broadcasts would
help sell more receivers. The Imperial Communications Committee—a sub-committee
of the Imperial Defence Committee—took hold of the question in April 1922. One of its
members had visited the USA and returned with horrifying tales of the near-anarchy
which was already overtaking the airwaves there, in a completely unregulated1 market.
This  testimony  convinced  the  committee  that  the  British  system  needed  to  be
regulated:  there  must  be  no  advertising  to  finance  programmes,  and  (following
pressure  from  the  newspapers)  no  broadcast  news  either.  Only  radio  equipment
manufacturers  should  be  allowed  to  broadcast  programmes2—of  music,  education,
religion, and entertainment.
2 It is well known that the first BBC, the British Broadcasting Company, was formed in
1922 to pool the resources of a number of such manufacturers, in a response to the
State’s early inclinations to contain the development of broadcasting. The General Post
Office (GPO) began to sell wireless receiving licences in November 1922, with half the
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proceeds  destined  to  finance  the  new  commercial  Company’s  necessarily  non-
commercial activities. John Reith was appointed to be the BBC’s General Manager. His
efforts to shape the company, and perhaps even to define the concept of public service
broadcasting, have been well documented.3 But if Reith and his colleagues at the BBC
thought that victory in this first battle with the British State had won them the war,
and that they were now free to develop broadcasting in Britain as they saw fit, they
were  soon  to  be  disillusioned.  The  BBC  has,  throughout  its  history  been  regularly
submitted to intense public scrutiny and required to justify its governance, its funding
model, its editorial choices, sometimes its very existence. This article will study the
remits of the various committees of enquiry which were commissioned to report on
British Broadcasting and the work of the BBC, in chronological order, from its birth
until  the  1990s,  in  order  to  determine  the  importance  of  each one,  its  role  in  the
Company/Corporation’s  development,  and possible lessons from the process for the
future.
 
Company to Corporation—Sykes and Crawford
3 The Company had a shaky start financially. Programmes were subsidised by wireless
manufacturers  from  a  levy  on  equipment  sales,  and  by  radio  licences,  as  already
mentioned.  But  many  amateur  radio  enthusiasts  built  their  own  equipment  from
scratch and were able to buy cheaper “experimental” licences which generated less
revenue for the BBC. The Company had barely come into existence when on 24 April
1923,  Major General  Sir  Frederick Sykes was asked to enquire into its  finances and
operations. Reith himself insisted that he should sit on the committee of enquiry to
represent the BBC’s point of view (the first and last time that such a senior BBC figure
should be granted a seat on a broadcasting committee).4
4 The  committee  examined  the  relationship  between  government  and  programme
content.  It  was  accepted  that  the  Postmaster-General  should  be  able  to  forbid  the
broadcast  of  news  which  was  not  in  the  public  interest;  but  that  more  general
responsibility for content was undesirable, if only to spare the minister’s blushes: “a
Minister might well shrink from the prospect of having to defend in Parliament the various items
in Government concerts”5—although the BBC’s Licence to broadcast  stipulated that its
programmes must be of a standard to meet “the reasonable satisfaction of the Postmaster-
General.6 The  committee  recommended  that  the  BBC  should  not  compete  with  the
printed press  by broadcasting news bulletins;  its  monopoly would give it  an unfair
advantage. Marconi’s London station, 2LO, had got into a spat with The Times (before
the  BBC’s  creation  in  1922)  by  reading  extracts  from  that  newspaper  aloud  in  its
programmes. The BBC reached an agreement with the press agencies in November 1922
which allowed it to broadcast a news summary provided by them each evening, well
after the publication of the evening press, in return for a cut of its licence-fee income.7
Curiously,  the  press  did  not  object  to  the  idea of  the  BBC broadcasting politicians’
speeches live.
5 Reith defended vigorously before the committee the position that the BBC should be
the nation’s only licenced broadcaster. He refused the term “monopoly”, however, on
the  grounds  that  any  wireless  manufacturer  could  join  the  list  of  the  company’s
shareholders.  But  he  was  already  shaping  the  BBC’s  future  as  a  public  service
broadcaster.8 The Postmaster-General also agreed on the need to maintain a monopoly,
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because of the scarcity of radio spectrum, but also for the simplicity of dealing with a
single  company  rather  than  a  number  of  competitors.  Nevertheless,  the  report’s
conclusions refused to rule out the possibility for the government to grant licences to
other broadcasters in the future if it was felt appropriate to do so;9 and the government
continued  to  allow  for  this  theoretical  possibility,  even  after  the  creation  of  the
Corporation, and despite much lobbying from Reith to abandon it (although it would be
another  half-century  before  the  State  licenced  the  first  competition  to  the  BBC  in
radio).
6 On  the  central  question  of  funding,  the  committee  faced  many  disagreements.
Advertising was ruled out, notably due to pressure from the printed press, which again
feared competition from radio; but also following negative observations from the USA,
where  advertising  was  felt  to  have  an  adverse  effect  on  programme  quality.  The
sponsorship  of  individual  programmes  or  programme  segments  was  not  felt  to
represent a similar danger,  and this  possibility was retained.10 The various wireless
receiving licence categories were to be merged into a single, ten-shilling licence, with
the GPO keeping an initial 25 per cent11 of the price—though this percentage would rise
with  the  number  of  licences  sold.  Royalties  from  the  sale  of  receivers  were  to  be
abandoned. Before the end of the Company’s existence, sales of licences had risen so
fast  that  the  Postmaster-General  decided  to  cap  the  BBC’s  income  at  £500,000  per
annum. The GPO retained all licence-fee revenue above this figure.
7 The BBC’s Licence was extended until 1926. So the dust had barely settled on the Sykes
report before the government commissioned the Earl of Crawford in July 1925 to chair
a new committee to  prepare for  the next  possible  Licence period by reviewing the
future of radio once again, “in the widest possible terms.”12
8 The BBC had begun to prepare its case for the renewal of its Licence even before the
committee was appointed. Reith had become uneasy with the Company’s commercial
status, which was often used as an argument against its privileged monopoly and its
protected  licence-fee  income.  Despite  reservations  from  some  of  the  Company’s
directors, who were perhaps naturally more concerned with defending its commercial
interests,  Reith  argued  in  a  written  submission  to  the  committee  that  the  “quasi-
commercial  constitution”  of  Company  should  be  abandoned  in  favour  of  a  new
constitution as a public service.13 The PMG agreed broadly with Reith’s view on this
point,  as  did  many  of  the  witnesses  heard  by  the  committee.  Links  with  wireless
manufacturers  should  be  severed,  and  those  with  listeners  and  the  nation
strengthened. The committee could scarcely fail to agree:
We think a public corporation the most appropriate organisation. Such an authority
would  enjoy  a  freedom  and  flexibility  which  a  Minister  of  State  himself  could
scarcely exercise in arranging for performers and programmes, and in studying the
variable demands of  public  taste and necessity.  […] Its  status and duties should
correspond with those of a public service, and its directorate should be appointed
with  the  sole  object  of  promoting  the  utmost  utility  and  development  of  the
enterprise.14
9 The proposed new status as public corporation15 would secure the BBC in its monopoly
without  some of  the  negative  connotations  which could  be  attached to  the  lack  of
competition for a commercial company. Reith himself no longer objected to the term,
and there was broad political consensus for the idea as the importance of broadcasting
in the life of the nation continued to grow. The BBC was to have a new constitution, but
ensure continuity in its programmes and for its internal hierarchy and staff. Licence-
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fee funding should continue, though how the cap on the BBC’s share of this funding
should evolve was left vague, and advertising was still excluded. Fears were expressed
in some quarters about the shadow which the government and the GPO might continue
to cast over a public corporation—and Reith was concerned notably about the power
the PMG held over the licence fee.
10 The  press  continued  to  oppose  allowing  the  BBC  to  broadcast  news  in  direct
competition to  newspapers.  With respect  to  ‘controversy’,16 the  committee  believed
that “a moderate amount of controversial material should be broadcast, provided the material is
of high quality and distributed with scrupulous fairness.”17 Quality must be preserved in all
programmes; the Reithian idea of giving people what was good for them, rather than
what they wanted, was shared by the great and the good sitting on the committee. The
suggestion  that  different  broadcast  frequencies  might  be  used  to  provide  a  choice
between  different  types  of  programme  received  a  lukewarm  reception:  “special
wavelengths or alternative services may provide an escape from the programme dilemma, but
we trust they will never be used to cater for groups of listeners, however large, who press for trite
and commonplace performances.”18
11 The report was published in early 1926, and by the end of the year preparations were in
place for the transition from private Company to public Corporation. Reith obtained a
slightly better financial deal on the licence fee: there would be no cap on the BBC’s
income, but its share of revenue would decline as the number of licences sold increased
(90 per cent of net revenue after the deduction of GPO collection costs, for the first
million  licences  sold,  falling  in  tranches  to  only  60  per  cent  on  the  fourth  and
subsequent millions).
12 The  government  did  not  initially  follow  Crawford’s  recommendation  that  the  BBC
should be freer to broadcast “controversy”; but the ban was lifted on an experimental
basis  in  March  1928  and  was  never  reinstated.  At  the  same  time,  the  Corporation
gradually regained ground confiscated early on by the press, by advancing the time of
its evening news broadcasts, and by opening its own newsroom rather than depending
on  “wire”  services.  The  outbreak  of  war  in  1939  brought  all  considerations  of
restricting the BBC’s news operations to an end.
13 The British Broadcasting Corporation was incorporated by Royal Charter on 1 January
1927 and was granted a new licence to broadcast for ten years. Reith (Now Sir John)
became the first Director-General, and a non-executive Chair and Board of Governors
were appointed to represent the public and licence-fee payer interest, and to answer
for the BBC to government, thus keeping the State at arm’s length. The basic principles
of the BBC governance and regulation would remain intact for the next eighty years.
 
Consolidation and Vision—Ullswater and Selsdon
14 Towards the end of the first Charter period, the government returned to what was
becoming the well-established habit of commissioning a committee of enquiry to make
recommendations for the future. In 1935, the Ullswater committee was appointed to:
consider the constitution, control, and finance of the broadcasting service in this
country and advise generally on the conditions under which the service, including
broadcasting to  the  Empire,  television broadcasting,  and the  system of  wireless
exchanges, should be conducted after 31 December 1936.19
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15 Reith had already begun lobbying the government  and Post  Office  officials  in  1933
before the committee was appointed, in the hope of a) increasing the BBC’s income
from  the  licence  fee;  b)  otherwise  preserving  the  status  quo;  and  c)  avoiding  the
appointment of a committee of enquiry at all. He was really only successful in the first
of these: the report recommended that the BBC should receive no less than 75 per cent
of  licence-fee  income,  and  that  further  funds  should  be  allocated  to  it  for  the
development of television.
16 Ullswater  was  the  first  committee  to  hear  evidence  from a  group hitherto  notably
absent from debates about what the BBC should be or do: its listeners. The Corporation
had barely, and somewhat reluctantly, started to consult listeners to sound out their
opinions on programmes. Reith remained hostile to such consultations, convinced as he
was  that  public  opinion  could  only  have  a  detrimental  effect  on  programmes  and
programme makers.  Polling started with specifically targeted groups:  teachers were
consulted about educational programming, for example. But the BBC was well into its
teens before its general listenership was allowed to express an opinion on programmes.
20 One of  the criticisms from listeners taken up in the report’s  conclusions may be
summarised in the more recent neologism that the BBC and its programmes were too
“London-centric”. This criticism has plagued the BBC throughout its history, and is still
heard today, despite recent efforts (not for the first time) to move various operations
and staff out of London and into the nations and regions.
17 Ullswater  furthermore  recommended  that  the  Empire  Service  (the  forerunner  of
today’s World Service) should be expanded, notably through more broadcasts in local
languages; that the Board of Governors should see its membership enlarged (from five
to seven seats); and that limits on news reporting should be further relaxed. In short,
there were few voices raised against the essence of what the BBC had become, and it
was considered that it deserved to see its Royal Charter renewed for another ten years.
The  government  broadly  accepted  the  committee’s  recommendations,  and  the  new
Charter was approved in the House of Commons in December 1936 without even the
need  for  a  division.  One  suggestion  from the  report  which  the  Postmaster-General
blocked, unsurprisingly, was the idea that broadcasting was becoming such a major
responsibility  that  it  should  be  removed  from  the  Post  Office  and  entrusted  to  a
minister and a department with more clout (for example, His Majesty’s Secretary of
State for the Home Department).  The PMG also removed the possibility (which had
never been taken up) for the BBC to broadcast programmes or features sponsored by a
commercial interest.
18 The mid-1930s were rather exceptional for the BBC in that it was under the scrutiny of
not  one  but  two  committees  of  enquiry.  Appointed  shortly  before  the  Ullswater
committee, and running for a while in parallel to it, the Selsdon committee was asked
to study the more technical question of television broadcast standards. It was asked to
choose between two rival  technologies,  developed by John Logie Baird and the EMI
company respectively; though it was also asked to advise on the future development
and funding of a television service. In keeping with the general confidence enjoyed by
the BBC at the time, Selsdon did not question that a future television service should be
entrusted to the BBC, and that the Corporation should retain its monopoly in all British
broadcasting.21
19 Funding was indeed a challenge: increasing the cost of the radio licence would be unfair
to the vast majority of the BBC’s audience, who would not have access to television for
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another two decades;  and sales  of  a  separate  television licence would not  generate
enough revenue to develop the technology and a viable programme service in the first
instance. Advertising was again ruled out, though the door to sponsored programmes
on television was left ajar (at the very moment it was, as has been seen, being closed for
wireless—or “sound” as the BBC increasingly called it at this period, at least internally).
The BBC itself was reluctant to divert its existing revenue from sound to vision. Selsdon
somewhat optimistically  suggested that  another source of  public  funding should be
identified. Ullswater’s mediation in the BBC’s conflict with the PMG over the share of
the licence fee deducted by the GPO represented a convenient solution here.
20 On the technical question, Selsdon was unable to decide. The Baird system was entirely
British, which gave it an economic and industrial advantage in the committee’s eyes;
whereas the EMI system was technically superior (allowing pictures of 405 “lines”—
compared with Baird’s 240-line system). As a result, the BBC was required to pursue the
development of both systems in parallel over a five-year test period, and the members
of the committee designated themselves to continue to observe and arbitrate during
this time. Test broadcasts did not begin immediately; the BBC needed to identify new
premises for the tests, and build and equip studios. Alexandra Palace in central north
London was chosen and became the home of BBC Television (along with Lime Grove
from the 1950s) until the construction of Television Centre at White City in 1960. The
parallel  broadcasts  (alternating  the  rival  systems  each  week)  proved
counterproductive,  since  potential  viewers  were  reluctant  to  invest  £30  to  £40
(approximately one-third of the price of a small motor car) in a piece of equipment
which could rapidly become a white elephant,  if  the other technology were to win. 
22They were abandoned within months, with EMI being declared the winner in February
1937. 23
 
Surviving Competition—Beveridge and Pilkington
21 By the end of the war, the BBC’s popularity was immense. It had preserved morale on
the “home front” and kept families in touch through the Forces’ Programme. It had
abandoned the Reithian practice24 of broadcasting programmes at different times each
day in order to “surprise” people into listening to something improving, in favour of
regular slots which allowed people to “listen in” to their favourite programmes daily or
weekly as more stable and thus reassuring fixtures. Even past conflicts with Churchill
were apparently forgotten. A new Royal Charter was granted almost as a matter of
course and without the need for a full committee of enquiry. A committee of ministers
from the National government, chaired by Lord Woolton, nevertheless produced some
recommendations: that the BBC should be essentially preserved without advertising;
that  the  radio  licence  fee  should  be  increased to  20  shillings  per  annum;  and that
overseas services developed during the war should be maintained and extended, but
placed under closer government control than domestic programmes. Arguments were
becoming more audible for authorising commercial competition for the BBC—Australia
and Canada were quoted as possible models—but neither of  the main party leaders
accepted  these.  Churchill’s  Conservatives  were  out  of  power  before  Woolton  could
produce a formal report,  but Attlee’s  incoming Labour government agreed that the
BBC’s Charter  should  be  renewed  for  another  five  years,  whilst  a  more  formal
committee of enquiry could consider the longer-term future.
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22 In 1949, Attlee asked William Beveridge—better known for his 1942 blueprint for the
Welfare  State,  and  now Liberal  peer  Lord  Beveridge—to  chair  a  new committee  of
enquiry. His report was only published in January 1951, and was to be the most detailed
examination of British broadcasting so far,  running to two volumes and almost 900
pages,  in  keeping with the  vast  remit  he  had received:  “To  consider  the  constitution,
control, finance and other general aspects of the sound and television broadcasting services of
the United Kingdom.” 25
23 There were concerns within the BBC that Beveridge’s Liberalism might make him less
disposed  than  previous  committee  chairs  had  been  to  continue  to  endorse  the
monopoly.  The  question  was  indeed  studied  in  more  detail  than  hitherto,  but  the
answer given was in favour of  the monopoly.26 Although some committee members
expressed different views, it was felt by the majority that advertising would bring down
programme standards, whether on the BBC or on competing channels. If competition
there  must  be,  then  it  should  come  from  one  or  more  new  public  corporations
competing  on  equal  terms  with  the  BBC.  But  even  this  form  of  competition  was
ultimately  felt  to  be  unnecessary,  and  liable  to  complicate  the  job  of  regulation:
“Enforcement of the necessary conditions of impartiality, fair treatment of minorities, regard to
national interest and regard to outside opinion, is likely to prove easier with one Corporation
than with three or four Corporations.”27 The conception of broadcasting as a public service
was not questioned; what was necessary was to ensure sufficient “safeguards against the
misuse of broadcasting power.”28 
24 In return for keeping its monopoly, the BBC must be more accountable to its Board of
Governors on a day-to-day basis. The Chair should work more closely with the D-G and
attend management meetings. The BBC should also consult its viewers and listeners—
and  above  all  start  actually  to  take  account  of  their  views,  notably  in  catering  to
minority needs and tastes. There were further calls for the BBC to serve the nations and
regions better, and to experiment with technological innovations, notably to allow the
creation of local radio stations. It should also be allowed greater scope to innovate in
making  political  programmes,29 and  to  transmit  party  political  broadcasts  during
election campaigns.
25 Attlee’s government, accepting the principal conclusions of the Beveridge committee,
was decided to grant the BBC a new Charter for 15 years; but Labour’s poor results in
the 1950 election and its eventual fall from power in 1951 left it neither the strength
nor the time to follow this intention through. The incoming Conservative PMG, Earl De
La  Warr,  extended  the  BBC’s  Charter  for  just  six  months,  so  that  yet  another
(ministerial) committee of enquiry could be formed to look at the whole question over
again. It concluded in a White Paper published in May 1952 that television should be
opened up to competition as soon as economically viable.30 The competition would be
commercial, the BBC retaining its monopoly over licence-fee income. Its Charter was
renewed for another ten years.
26 There was much opposition to the idea of commercial broadcasting. The BBC lobbied
the government strenuously in private,  and a number of  Conservative peers in the
Lords resisted the government’s proposals. Never one to cower behind understatement,
Lord Reith himself placed the introduction of commercial broadcasting into the UK on
a par with that of “smallpox, bubonic plague and the Black Death.”31 The Television Act 1954
was nevertheless on the statute books within two years, and the first networks under
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the responsibility of the new Independent Television Authority (ITA) on the air within
little more than three.
27 At the turn of the decade, as the end of the BBC’s latest Charter period approached, and
an  assessment  of  the  first  years  of  commercial  television  became  possible,  the
Conservative  government  asked  the  Pilkington  committee  to  study  the  future  of
broadcasting in the UK, the possibility of creating a third television channel, and the
industry’s financial arrangements. The BBC was worried; ITV dominated the television
audience  ratings  charts  (albeit  on  the  back  of  “give-aways”—game  shows  with
extravagant prizes for answering questions which were much criticised in the quality
press and by both sides in Parliament as idiotic), and the Corporation’s audience share
had been known to fall to barely one-quarter (i.e. three viewers in four were watching
“the other side”).
28 The Pilkington report focused on programme quality; it refused to define what “good
broadcasting” was, but expected both the BBC and ITA to recognise it when they saw it.
32 BBC programmes were criticised when they attempted to ape ITV’s style in direct
competition; the rest of the time, they were mostly hitting that indefinable mark: “The
BBC know good broadcasting; by and large, they are providing it.”33 ITV, on the other hand,
was falling “well short of what a good public service of broadcasting should be.”34 The ITA
should play a much more active role in regulating the companies, and even in deciding
what programmes they should make and when they should be scheduled.  The BBC
should continue as it had been doing, so that competition would play out for quality
rather than ratings.35 When a third television channel became possible,  it  should of
course be entrusted to the BBC. This would allow it to diversify its programmes and
better  serve  minority  groups  in  a  way which ITV,  subject  as  it  was  to  commercial
pressures, would be unable to do.36 In radio, the monopoly should be preserved, and
local radio pursued, thanks notably to new VHF frequencies.
29 The government’s response came in the form of two successive White Papers. It did not
seek  significantly  to  reform  the  ITA  and  ITV;37 nor  did  it  pursue  Pilkington’s
suggestions  that  subscription  TV might  be  worth  considering,  or  allow the  BBC to
develop local  radio.38 It  did,  of  course,  entrust  the third channel  to  the BBC,  to  be
broadcast on 625 lines and in colour when possible. Both BBC and ITV were required to
increase their educational output.  Labour suggested that the future BBC2 should be
entirely  devoted  to  education.  Carleton  Greene  preferred  a second  mainstream
channel,  but  one  with  more  cultural  and  experimental  content  than  the  existing
channel (now to become BBC1). The two channels would seek to be complementary to
one another (and by the same occasion, it was hoped, be less concerned with competing
with ITV).
 
Towards a Multi-Channel Future—Annan
30 Towards the end of the 1960s, the Labour government was planning to appoint a new
committee of enquiry into the future of broadcasting—and had already identified Lord
Annan as its chair. When Heath’s Conservatives won the election of 1970, the plan was
put on hold. The Tory minister for Posts and Telecommunications39 decided without the
need for  a  committee  of  enquiry  that  radio  could  be  opened up to  competition as
television had been, so that the ITA became the Independent Broadcasting Authority
(IBA)  and  was  allowed  to  grant  Independent  Local  Radio  (ILR)  licences.  Another
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Crawford committee (chaired this time by one Sir Stewart Crawford—apparently no
relation  to  Lord  Crawford  of  the  1926  report)  met  briefly  in  1974  to  examine
broadcasting in the national regions. It recommended that both the BBC and IBA devote
more resources to the nations, notably for broadcasting in the Welsh language.
31 When  Labour  won  back  power  in  1974,  it  abolished  the  Ministry  of  Posts  and
Telecommunications,  and  entrusted  responsibility  for  broadcasting  to  the  Home
Secretary. In April, Roy Jenkins reinstated the Annan committee and asked it to look
into the future of  broadcasting in the light of  the technological  and social  changes
which  had  taken  place  since  Pilkington.  It took  several  years  to  report;  in  the
meantime, the government extended the BBC’s Charter and ITV’s franchises until 1976,
then again until 1979 (the report was published in 1977), and finally, since a general
election was imminent, again until 1981.
32 Annan studied various  technological  innovations  and made certain  predictions:  the
advent of the domestic video recorder; the possibilities offered by cable as a means of
broadcast  delivery;  and  an  increasing  number  of  TV  channels—though  he  did  not
imagine direct broadcasting by satellite as a possibility, and believed that a finite pool
of  talent  for  television  would  limit  the  multiplication  of  channels  available.  Cable
television  should  not  supply  its  own new,  commercial  channels,  but  rather  deliver
those of existing public service broadcasters, and perhaps allow community television
at a very local level. The committee did not expect any future channels to deviate from
public  service  broadcasting  principles,  and  was  determined  to  “preserve  British
broadcasting as a public service accountable to the public through Parliament. This tradition
has long been accepted by the nation and our recommendations are designed to strengthen it.”40
The USA was again quoted as a counter-example, where deregulation and commercial
competition had reduced choice and driven down standards.
33 Within the framework of public service broadcasting, a new flexibility was needed. The
BBC should keep two television and four national radio channels, but should abandon
local radio. Regional television should be the preserve of a re-cast IBA, with another
authority created for local broadcasting. Yet another authority could run the future
fourth  television  channel,  with  commercial  funding  but  a  different  remit  to  avoid
direct competition with ITV. The Open University, the Arts Council, the Trades Union
Congress  and  the  Confederation  of  British  Industry  should  all  be  allowed  to  make
programmes for  broadcast  on the fourth channel  if  they were prepared to  pay for
them.41
34 The committee heard much evidence to the effect that neither broadcaster was moving
sufficiently with the times, that both ITV and—perhaps even more so—the BBC were
too  paternalistic,  too  conservative  or  elitist  in  their  artistic  choices,  too  male,  too
white. Annan agreed: “Our society’s culture is now multi-racial and pluralist: that is to say,
people adhere to different views of the nature and purpose of life and expect their own view to be
expressed in some form or other.”42 He suggested that, to the BBC’s traditional vocation, “to
inform, to educate, to entertain” should be added a fourth mission: “enrichment—to enlarge
people’s interests, to convey to them new choices and possibilities in life.”43
35 The  Labour  government  accepted  many  of  Annan’s  ideas  and  recommendations.  It
began to make plans for a fourth TV channel to be placed under the responsibility of an
Open Broadcasting Authority. Although Harold Wilson had left frontline politics a year
before Annan reported, his legendary dislike and mistrust of the BBC was still felt in
the  Labour  White  Paper  which  followed.  There  was  a  strong  suggestion  that  the
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Corporation was not sufficiently neutral politically, and even the veiled threat to create
a new layer of management just below the Board of Governors, some of whose members
would be appointed directly by the Home Secretary.44
 
The Assault of the Market - Peacock
36 Many of the plans (and threats) in the White Paper were never carried out. The Labour
government which thought the BBC too pro-Tory was replaced with a Conservative one
which was even more convinced that the Corporation was staffed entirely by pinkos.45
After the launch of Channel 4—with surprisingly few tweaks to Labour’s plans—in 1982,
and  her  second election  victory  in  1983,  it  was  widely  believed  and  expected  that
Margaret Thatcher would be looking to pick a fight with the BBC, and that the creation
of the Peacock committee to look into the Corporation’s future funding was to be the
centrepiece battle of the war.
37 By the 1980s, colour television was clearly the norm and the number of colour licences
was stabilising. The BBC could no longer count on significant numbers of households
switching  from  the  cheaper  black-and-white  licence  to  the  pricier  colour  one  to
guarantee a continuously rising income. The cost of the licence fee itself—set by the
government—became  the  key  factor  in  the  BBC’s  finances.  Thatcher’s  first  Home
Secretary, William Whitelaw, was comparatively compliant, and accepted the regular
increases the BBC requested. His successor, Leon Brittan, was less receptive when the
BBC asked in 1984 for an increase from £46 to £65. Brittan awarded the BBC £58 after
six  months  of  reflection,  and at  the  same time announced the  appointment  of  the
Peacock committee to study the very future of the television licence. Thatcher herself
was known to be favourable to advertising as a replacement for the licence fee, and
probably  to  the  complete  privatisation  of  broadcasting  (her  government  was  busy
privatising  many other  public  services  at  the  time).  But  there  was  resistance  from
within her ranks, and from the civil service: the same Willie Whitelaw threatened to
resign  if  Thatcher  imposed  advertising  on  the  BBC;46 and  Home  Office  officials
intervened in the appointments to the Peacock committee to ensure that it was more
politically  balanced  (to  the  extent  that  a  Sunday  Times  editorial  later  called  the
committee “obstinately open-minded.”)47
38 Peacock’s  was  the  first  committee  to  be  tasked  with  studying  only  the  funding  of
broadcasting, without regard for the nature or quality of programmes, or the notion of
public service; and to reason in terms of “consumers” rather than viewers or citizens.48
The committee ignored these implied restrictions on its remit and functioned rather as
its  predecessors  had  done.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  its  witnesses  were
unfavourable  to  changing  the  BBC’s  status  or  imposing  advertising.  Whatever  the
implicit  pressure  from Downing Street  or  the  neoliberal  convictions  of  some of  its
members wishing it to conclude otherwise, the committee could not but report that:
the introduction of advertising into the BBC, even in a gradual phased way, is likely
to depress the growth of ITV revenues compared with what they would otherwise
be  […];  so  long  as  spectrum  scarcity  prevails,  and  there  is  no  direct  means  of
consumer  payment  for  programmes,  rivalry  between  two  systems  even  partly
dependent on advertising is likely to intensify the “ratings war” and so reduce the
effective range of choice open to viewers and listeners.49
39 Peacock’s conclusions were not a resounding endorsement of the first 65 years of the
BBC for all that. Public service broadcasting saw its role, in the report’s vision of the
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industry,  confined  to  completing  at  the  margins what  the  commercial  sector  was
unable—or found it uneconomic—to provide. The market satisfies the consumer; the
public service plugs the gaps for the citizen. According to this logic, the industry as a
whole was ripe for deregulation, to increase competition and thus choice, to allow for
the creation of new cable and satellite channels and new economic models based on
subscription or pay-per-view. The BBC’s role was thus expected to diminish over time,
until the universal licence fee could be replaced by voluntary subscription for those
citizens who still craved a PSB fix. In the meantime, Peacock recommended that parts
of the BBC could be privatised immediately: popular music channels Radios 1 and 2
were  not,  the  committee  felt,  providing a  public  service  which justified  licence-fee
funding.
40 As  a  liberal  with  a  lower-case  “l”,  Peacock  also  suggested  that  broadcasting  be
deregulated in terms of its content:
The end of all censorship arrangements would be a sign that broadcasting had come
of age, like publishing three centuries ago. Prepublication censorship, whether of
printed  material,  plays,  films,  broadcasting  or  other  creative  activities  or
expressions of opinion, has no place in a free society and we would want to advise
Government  and  Parliament  to  embark  forthwith  on  a  phased  programme  for
ending it.50
41 This  was  the  sort  of  recommendation Thatcher  could  never  be  expected to  follow.
Indeed, in 1988 she created the Broadcasting Standards Council to work alongside the
existing Broadcasting Complaints Commission, as a new watchdog to safeguard “taste
and decency”—and reinforced rules further in this area in the Broadcasting Act 1990.
 
Conclusion
42 Peacock was the last committee of enquiry into broadcasting of our period. As has been
seen, its conception of public service broadcasting and its expectations for the future
evolution of the sector were hardly causes for optimism for the BBC, even if its licence-
fee  funding  model  was  secure  for  the  time  being.  Since  then,  the  sector,  and  the
market, have evolved well beyond what most of our committee members could have
imagined; the number of channels and the technical means of delivering them have
grown exponentially  (irrespective  of  whether  or  not  one  is  tempted  to  agree  with
Annan’s  assessment  of  the  “finite  talent  pool”  for  programmes  which  he  believed
would eventually bring such expansion to a halt).
43 Peacock’s questions have not gone away. Major’s government asked them again in the
1990s (and answered them much as Peacock had done),51 and Blair’s government tasked
another committee with examining them again (albeit with the expectation that the
licence  fee  would  survive  for  the  duration  of  the  then  current  Charter  period  but
perhaps not beyond).52 When seen in the longer perspective of the many committees
which have been more or less critical of the BBC down the decades, however, and just
as  importantly,  in  the  perspective  of  the  BBC’s  ability  to  weather  out  the  various
political  storms  which  have  buffeted  it  over  the  same  period,  it  is  perhaps  less
surprising  that  nearly  35  years  after  Peacock,  the  BBC is  still  with  us.  As  Dominic
Cummings  wheedles  Boris  Johnson  on  to  another  bout  of  sabre-rattling  outside
Broadcasting House, they would perhaps both do well to remember, even beyond the
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obvious importance that voters attach to their BBC, that no serious public scrutiny of
the Corporation so far has concluded for anything other than the need to preserve it.
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NOTES
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called cross-media ownership was explicitly ruled out.
3. Rather less well documented is the way Reith seemed tempted to re-write the history of his
already undeniably central role, in order to make it even more impressive. He claimed in 1960: “I
literally didn’t know what broadcasting was. The advertisement was attractive; I thought it was the sort of
thing I wanted, and I applied.” Though he went on to specify that he felt qualified “to manage almost
anything.” Lord Reith speaking with John Freeman in Face to Face (London, BBC TV, 9 October
1960).  See also Andrew Boyle,  Only the Wind will  Listen (London, Hutchinson,  1972) on Reith’s
claims with respect to ‘public service broadcasting’.
4. The more technical  remit  of  the Selsdon committee did allow senior BBC engineers to be
appointed to its membership.
5. Broadcasting Committee Report, Cd. 1951 (London, HMSO, 1923) (Sykes Report), paragraph 25.
6. Wireless Broadcasting Licence, Cd. 1822 (London, HMSO, 1923), paragraph 5.
7. The news summary was provided by Reuters, the Press Association, Exchange Telegraph, and
Central News. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume I: The Birth of
Broadcasting (London, Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 132.
8. Reith  identified  monopoly  as  one  of  the  four  characteristics  defining  public  service
broadcasting; the others were that its operations should be motivated by the notion of service
rather than profit, that it should seek to serve all citizens equally throughout the UK, and that it
should strive for the highest standards possible in programme making. John Reith, Broadcast Over
Britain (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), pp. 57 ff.
9. Skyes Report, op. cit., paragraph 76.
10. “We consider however, that there would be no objection to the operating concern being allowed to
accept the gift of a concert and to broadcast a preliminary announcement giving the name of the donor;
and also to broadcast the name of the publisher and the price of a song which is about to be broadcast.” 
Ibid., paragraph 41.
11. Previously, GPO administration costs had been levied at 50 per cent.
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12. Postmaster-General Sir William Mitchell-Thomson speaking in the House of Commons of the
creation of the Crawford committee: Hansard, vol. 186, col. 1872, 20 July 1925.
13. Reith’s Memorandum of Information to the Crawford committee, p. 9, quoted in Briggs, op. cit.,
p. 335.
14. Report  of  the  Broadcasting  Committee,  Cd.  2599  (London,  HMSO,  1925)  (Crawford  Report),
paragraphs 3-4.
15. The committee in the end preferred the name British Broadcasting Commission—a suggestion
overruled by the PMG.
16. The term was commonly used at the time for any type of news, including the broadcasting of
parliamentary proceedings, whose coverage might expose the BBC to criticism for a perceived
lack of neutrality—although the word could also have a broader scope, beyond current events,
for example to matters of taste and decency.
17. Ibid., paragraph 12.
18. Ibid., paragraph 14.
19. Report  of  the  Broadcasting  Committee,  Cd.  5091  (London,  HMSO,  1936)  (Ullswater  Report),
paragraph 1.
20. And the opinions were indeed unwelcome: if the first listening figures, established for the
year 1937, showed properly enough that the King’s Christmas broadcast was the most popular
programme of  the  year,  consultations  also  showed that  as  many as  80  per  cent  of  listeners
regularly switched the BBC off on Sundays in favour of Radio Normandie or Radio Luxembourg’s
English-language stations, because of the former’s policy of broadcasting no entertainment at all
and favouring religious programmes on that day of the week. The BBC’s programming policy
remained unchanged. Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume II: The
Golden Age of Wireless (London, Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 271.
21. Report of the Television Committee, Cd. 4793 (London, HMSO, 1935) (Selsdon Report), paragraph
39.
22. Some 20,000 sets were sold before television broadcasts were interrupted on 1 September
1939 to focus resources on radio, for which more than 9 million households held licences at the
outbreak of the war. George V’s coronation procession was seen by around 50,000 viewers in May
1937.
23. Another rather technical committee of enquiry, chaired by Lord Hankey, decided in the final
months of the war that the 405-line system should be kept when programmes were able to re-
start after the war, because this would allow the service to resume in less than a year, whereas if
the suggested “high-definition” alternative of 600-plus lines were to be developed, programmes
might be delayed by another five years. BBC Television restarted in 1946 on VHF frequencies and
405 lines; BBC2 began to broadcast in 625 lines on UHF in 1964, and in colour from 1967. From
1969, the transmissions of the then three television networks moved to UHF and colour—though
legacy simultaneous re-broadcasts in 405 lines lasted locally into the 1980s for viewers with older
sets.
24. Reith himself had left the BBC in 1938. It has been suggested—for example, by his successor
Greg  Dyke  in  Greg  Dyke  on  Lord  Reith (London,  BBC  Four,  23  May  2007)—that  PM  Neville
Chamberlain, who offered him the chair of Imperial Airways, left him little choice in the matter,
and that Reith was thus forced out of the BBC, perhaps at the request of its Governors, because he
was becoming something of a liability due to his overbearing management style.
25. Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Cmd. 8116 (Volume I) and Report of the Broadcasting
Committee,  1949:  Memoranda Submitted to the Committee,  Cmd. 8117 (Volume II)  (London, HMSO,
1951) (Beveridge Report).
26. Ibid., Volume I, paragraph 187.
27. Ibid., paragraph 171.
28. Ibid., paragraph 180.
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29. The  so-called  “fourteen-day  rule”  according  to  which  the  BBC  must  not  cover  in  its
programmes any topic which was due to be debated in Parliament within the next fortnight, was
already less strictly adhered to. The rule dated from censorship during the war, but was in reality
not formally stated in any official  text and depended on voluntary observance. The PMG, Dr
Charles  Hill,  did attempt to impose it  by ministerial  order in July 1955,  but  withdrew it  the
following year following widespread criticism in the press. 
30. Broadcasting: Memorandum on the Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1949, Cmd. 8550 (London,
HMSO, 1952), paragraph 7.
31. Hansard, vol. 176, col. 1297, 22 May 1952.
32. Report  of  the  Committee  on Broadcasting,  1960,  Cmnd. 1753 (London,  HMSO, 1962) (Pilkington
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standards;  and  by  the  time  the  Pilkington  report  was  published,  it  was  well  on  the  way  to
scraping back half  of  viewers.  See Sir  Hugh Carleton Greene,  The Third  Floor  Front:  A  View of
Broadcasting in the Sixties (London, Bodley Head, 1969), pp.131 ff.
36. This logic is interesting to bear in mind when considering the launch of Channel 4 in 1982,
and the remit it was given.
37. Though the ITA’s powers were increased in 1963 and again in 1964 to allow it to curb some of
the excesses deplored by Pilkington.
38. Labour allowed local radio from 1966, with the first stations being collaborations between
local  authorities  and  the  BBC.  BBC  Radio  Leicester  was  the  first  to  start  broadcasting  in
November 1967. The network grew faster in the early 1970s with a revaluation of the television
licence fee, and the growth in income from the more expensive colour licence, and this despite
the fact that the radio licence was abandoned in 1971.
39. Christopher Chataway—the second minister to hold the title; Labour had abandoned the term
Postmaster-General in 1969.
40. Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting, Cmnd. 6753 (London, HMSO, 1977) (Annan
Report), paragraph 30.1.
41. Some of the future identity of Channel 4 is clearly discernible here, even if its final remit and
regulatory arrangements were rather different.
42. Ibid., paragraph 4.5.
43. Ibid., paragraph 3.22.
44. Broadcasting, Cmnd. 7294 (London, HMSO, 1978).
45. Thatcherite loyalist Norman Tebbit wrote in his autobiography of his perception of BBC staff
at Television Centre on the evening of the 1983 election victory: “The atmosphere in the studio was
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48. Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC, Cmnd. 9824 (London, HMSO, 1986) (Peacock Report),
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ABSTRACTS
The BBC has been subjected to legitimate public scrutiny throughout its history. Governments
have regularly commissioned committees of enquiry to study its role, its values, its programmes,
its  funding,  its  future.  Far from destabilising the Corporation,  these enquiries  have tended—
sometimes against expectations—to confirm the importance of the BBC in the life of the nation.
Although programmes and technologies have evolved beyond recognition since his time, Reith’s
founding principles of public service broadcasting have been endorsed time and again. The BBC
and its funding model are never completely out of the woods; but a longer view of the constant
cycle of public enquiries shows that it is in every sense hard to beat.
La BBC, depuis ses débuts, fait l’objet d’un examen minutieux et légitime. Au fil des décennies, les
pouvoirs publics ont multiplié les commissions d’enquête chargées de se pencher sur son rôle, ses
valeurs,  ses  émissions,  son  financement,  son  avenir.  Loin  de  déstabiliser  la  Corporation,  ces
enquêtes ont plutôt tendance – parfois contre toute attente – à confirmer l’importance de la BBC
dans la vie de la nation.  Même si  les émissions et  les technologies ont profondément évolué
depuis l’époque de Reith, les valeurs fondatrices de service public voulues par celui-ci ont été
réaffirmées à maintes reprises. La BBC et son modèle de financement continuer régulièrement de
susciter  doutes  et  interrogations ;  mais  un  regard  diachronique  sur  le  cycle  incessant  de
commissions d’enquête montre qu’ils tiennent encore et toujours la route.
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